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Abstract
This paper compares the performance of a two-sided combinatorial call market, direct nego-
tiation, and double auction for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct
negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms. The combinatorial call market
tends to alleviate the exposure problem, and performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable,
and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are un-
challenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market, however, suffers from the holdout problem
when the number of subjects and commodities is small.
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1 Introduction
This study examines alternative mechanisms for consolidating fragmented land.
In many former communist countries, farmland was allocated through
administrative procedures in an effort to introduce private ownership in the 1990s
(Deininger, 2002; Lerman et al., 2002). In Tien Xa 3 Village in Vietnam,
farmland was classified into twelve grades as shown in Figure 1.  Numerous plots
of different land grades and locations were allocated to each household in hopes
of achieving equality. As a result, households received as many as 20 plots,
although the total land area averaged less than 0.3 hectare. Land fragmentation,
i.e., non-contiguous landholdings, can cause significant levels of production loss
due to high supervision costs and increased time requirement. Wan and Cheng
(2001) estimate China’s grain output could rise by 15.3 percent if fragmentation
were eliminated.
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Land fragmentation is not unique to transition economies. It’s considered
to be one of the most serious obstacles to agricultural growth in many countries
(Heston and Kumar, 1983; Jabarin and Epplin, 1994; Monke et al., 1992; Parikh
and Shah, 1994; Simons, 1985). Deininger (2003) points out how land
fragmentation is one of the major sources of high transaction costs in land
Figure 1 Grades of Farmlands in Tien Xa 3 Village
                        (1=Highest Grade, 12=Lowest Grade)
1
Tanaka: Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
markets. Assembling contiguous land parcels and creating a plot large enough to
be a viable cultivation size requires a farmer to negotiate with numerous small
landowners.
Several Western European countries have undertaken land consolidation
projects (Vitikainen, 2004). However, the participation is often involuntary, and
land appraisal involves lengthy and complicated procedures. Vitikainen (2004)
articulates the need to develop more cost-effective, simpler and faster procedures
for land consolidation.
Can we expect land markets to solve fragmentation? Sabates-Wheeler
(2002) reports that the World Bank is encouraging market-assisted land reform
and looking to land markets to solve problems of land fragmentation in Albania.
Under the market-assisted land reform, the government provides grants to farmers
so they can negotiate with each other and redistribute land assets through market
transactions (Deininger, 1999). Deininger (2002) asserts that supportive
institutions are needed for land markets to function efficiently, and such
institutions do not emerge by themselves.
The above empirical evidence indicates a need to design an allocation
mechanism to facilitate land consolidation. By conducting laboratory
experiments, this study compares the performance of several market institutions
that may facilitate efficient redistributions of fragmented land parcels. We
consider the following setting: 1) Each individual’s preference over land parcels
is private information, 2) Individuals initially hold land parcels dispersed in
multiple locations, 3) There is a cost associated with holding dispersed land. The
cost increases with the distance between parcels. Similar to the market-assisted
land reform, we provide monetary endowments to experimental subjects so they
can exchange their assets without facing budget constraints.
Experiments have some advantages in testing the performance of market
mechanisms (Plott, 1999; Plott, 1994).  In experiments, we can create design
features that do not exist in naturally-occurring markets, and compare the
performance of different market mechanisms. We conduct experiments in
simplified market environments but attempt to maintain the features inherent to
land consolidation problems.
Land allocation is important because of its role in economic growth. It’s
also a canonical example of resource allocation with complementarities, which is
similar to other important economic environments. One example is the
telecommunication spectrum allocation problem, in which owners desire to
assemble geographically adjacent licenses (Ausubel et al., 1997; Cramton, 1998;
Milgrom, 2000). Or suppose “geography” is not literal physical location, but
represents any perceptual dimension in which nearby objects are more valuable
when owned jointly. The analysis here might also apply to industrial domains like
products which are grouped together in an attribute space. Another potential
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application is social domains like fraternities, college dorms, and neighborhoods
where people prefer to congregate with others like themselves.
There are a number of experimental studies on the performance of market
mechanisms when there are synergies across commodities. Ledyard, Porter and
Rangel (1997) and Bykowsky, Cull and Ledyard (2000) demonstrate how
combinatorial mechanisms dominate both simultaneous and sequential non-
combinatorial auctions when there are synergies among commodities. Banks,
Olson, Porter, Rassenti and Smith (2003) and Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine and
Smith (2003) compare the performance of the simultaneous auction used by the
FCC and a combinatorial auction. They conclude that when licenses are
complements, the combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous auction.
The present study differs from the earlier research in two ways. First,
previous studies often assume superadditive valuations in which competitive
equilibrium prices do not exist, then study the exposure problem, i.e., exposure to
losses from failing to aggregate licenses. Poor performance of a mechanism may
be due to the non-existence of competitive equilibrium, or due to the exposure
problem. This study shows how risk exposure problems may still arise even with
subadditive valuations. In our study, competitive equilibrium prices exist but
subjects still face exposure problems. This allows us to separate the exposure
problem from the problem associated with non-existence of competitive
equilibrium.
Second, the existing studies investigate one-sided markets.  Our study
examines two-sided markets in which individuals initially own resources to be
reallocated. In two-sided markets, we expect to face different strategic behavior
problems from those discussed in the one-sided market studies (Milgrom, 1998,
2000). When an individual attempts to consolidate his holdings, he may face
holdouts by the owners of neighboring parcels. This characteristic is shared by
other resource allocation problems of location-specific resources, including
reallocation negotiation of spectrum licenses. Cramton, Kwerel and Williams
(1998) model the reallocation negotiations in spectrum licenses, and point out
potential holdout problems but no study has studied holdout problems
empirically.
We compare the performance of three alternative mechanisms; direct
negotiation, a double auction and a combinatorial market. The negotiation
procedure is similar to the market-assisted land reform (Deininger, 1999). Under
the market-assisted land reform, the government provides grants to farmers so
they can negotiate with landowners and purchase land plots. There is a key
difference between the negotiation procedure in our experiment and the market-
assisted reform. Under the negotiation procedure in our experiment, subjects deal
with all potential trading partners simultaneously whereas in the market-assisted
reform, farmers have to search for potential trading partners and negotiate with
3
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them bilaterally. Double auction tend to generate efficient outcomes more quickly
and consistently compared with other market institutions when competitive
equilibrium exists (Davis and Holt, 1993). Under the parameters used in the
experiment, competitive equilibrium prices exist. Theoretically speaking, we thus
expect efficient outcomes to emerge as a result of competition in double auction.
We also test a combinatorial market because the studies on one-sided markets
suggest combinatorial mechanisms perform better than other mechanisms when
there are synergies among commodities.
An important question is which institution actually yields more efficient
outcomes when markets are two-sided and there exist competitive equilibrium
prices. Do combinatorial mechanisms still outperform simple (non-combinatorial)
mechanisms even when markets are two-sided? Do double auctions perform
better than other mechanisms as long as there exist competitive equilibrium
prices? How does “holdout” affect market performance?
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the market
environments. In Section 3, we discuss the mechanisms tested. Section 4
describes experimental procedures. Section 5 reports the results and Section 6
contains a summary of conclusions.
2 Market Environment
Suppose there are multiple locations, and there are multiple parcels in each
location. Also assume agents have stand-alone value for each parcel, and let us
denote agent i’s stand-alone value on the k-th parcel   lk by   vi(lk ). We will
explicitly model the cost of fragmentation. Assume there are two kinds of costs
associated with fragmentation. First, there is a cost associated with holding non-
contiguous parcels within a location, which we call Gap Cost 1 in the
experiments. Gap Cost 1 increases with the size of “gap” between parcels within a
location. Second, there is a cost associated with having parcels in multiple
locations, which we call Gap Cost 2. Gap Cost 2 increases with the distance an
agent needs to travel between the most distant locations in his holdings. Gap
Costs equal zero if an agent holds contiguous land parcels in only one location.
Appendix describes the precise structure of Gap Costs used in the experiment.
Agent i’s value function over a set of parcels,   X, can be expressed as
follow:
  
vi(X) = vi(lk )
lk ?X
? ?[Total Gap Cost 1]?[Gap Cost 2]
The value of a set of parcels to agent i is the summation of stand-alone
values of individual parcels comprising the set X, minus total Gap Costs. Note the
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valuation function of the agents is subadditive.1 Under the parameters used in this
study, there exist competitive equilibrium prices that support efficient allocations.
However, to realize the efficient allocations, some individuals may have to pay
more than their stand-alone values for some parcels. An agent may face potential
exposure to losses if he fails to aggregate adjoining parcels. This is commonly
known as the “exposure problem” in the spectrum auction studies.
We conducted four series of experiments, which we labeled Series1
through Series 4. In Series 1 and 3 of our experiments, agents do not pay more
than their stand-alone values for any of the parcels under competitive equilibrium
prices. In Series 2 and 4, by contrast, agents will have to pay more than their
stand-alone values for some parcels under competitive equilibrium prices. Thus,
we expect exposure problems to be more severe in Series 2 and 4 compared with
Series 1 and 3.
In Series 1 and 2, we conducted experiments with 3 subjects and 6 parcels.
In Series 3 and 4, we increase the numbers of subjects and parcels to 8 and 16
respectively, to investigate the robustness of the performance to scaling up. In
addition, we use three sets of initial endowments to examine if initial allocations
matter.
Series 1
In Series 1, there are three agents, numbered 1, 2, and 3, and two
locations, A and B. In each location there are three parcels. There are a total of six
parcels in the economy. Each subject has stand-alone values for each parcel as
shown in Table 1. Note these valuations are private information. The value of any
combination of commodities is the sum of the valuations of the individual
commodities minus Gap Costs. Gap Cost 1 is associated with holding non-
contiguous parcels within one location, i.e., A1 and A3, or B1 and B2. Gap Cost 2
is associated with having parcels across two locations. For the simplicity of
experiments, we use the same amount of costs, 1000 francs2, for both Gap Costs 1
and 2. Appendix describes the structure of Gap Costs. It is a simplified setting and
the choice of values and gap costs has no empirical foundation. However, we
believe it still captures the essence of problems caused by land fragmentation, i.e.,
production loss due to increased time requirement for management and
production activities.
The efficient allocation assigns all parcels in Location A to Subject
Number 3, and all parcels in Location B to Subject Number 1. There exist a range
of competitive equilibrium prices that support the efficient allocation. Table 1
                                                 
1  A value function   v i(X)  is subadditive if for all X,Y ? L  and X?Y ??,
vi(X) + vi(Y ) ? vi(X +Y )
2  Francs are the currency used in the experiments.
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summarizes the lowest and highest equilibrium prices that can be undertaken for
each commodity. Equilibrium prices are interdependent across locations. For each
parcel, the stand-alone value of the agent who should obtain it in the efficient
allocation is below the upper limit of the competitive equilibrium price. Thus,
agents do not have to pay more than their stand-alone values for individual
parcels in the process of realizing efficient aggregation if trades occur within the
range of competitive prices. However subjects may try to extract gains from trade
by holding out critical inner parcels (A2 and B2).
Table 1  Stand-Alone Values and Competitive Equilibrium Prices in Series 1
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3
Agent ID Stand-Alone Values
#1 1200 1100 900 900 800 700
#2 1300 1200 1100 800 700 600
#3 1500 1400 1300 600 500 400
Equilibrium Prices
Lowest 1300 1200 1100 800 700 600
Highest 1500 1600 1300 900 900 700
Note 1: Bold indicates the efficient allocation.
Note 2: Gap Cost 1 = 1000, Gap Cost 2 = 1000
Note 3: Equilibrium prices are interdependent.
When prices of A2 and B2 are above 1400 and 800 respectively, following
constraints apply:
1300 ? PA1 ?1500,1400 ? PA 2 ? 2900?PA1,1100 ? PA 3 ? 2700?PA 2
  800 ? PB1 ? 900, 800 ? PB2 ?1700 ?PB1, 600 ? PB3 ?1500 ?PB2
At the beginning of each period, each subject was given a portfolio of 2
parcels and a certain amount of francs as working capital. We use three sets of
initial endowments, namely, the Easy Initial Endowment, the Moderate Initial
Endowment, and the Hard Initial Endowment. The three initial endowments differ
in terms of necessary number of trades it requires to realize efficient allocations,
and also differ in whether the subjects with the second highest values hold critical
inner parcels or not.
Table 2 indicates who owns which commodities in each set of the initial
endowments. The Easy Initial Endowment is a relatively unchallenging set of
initial endowments compared to the next two sets of endowments for two reasons.
First, two out of six parcels are efficiently allocated in the initial endowment.
Second, A2 and B2, the central parcels in Location A and B, are owned by
Subject Number 1 and 3, who value these parcels the least among all subjects,
respectively. Like the Easy Endowment, two out of six parcels are efficiently
allocated in the Moderate Initial Endowment. This set of initial endowments may
6
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be harder than the Easy Endowment because Subject Number 2 initially holds the
critical inner parcels, A2 and B2, even though he holds no parcels in the efficient
allocation. Subject 2 may try to hold these inner parcels to extract as much gains
from trade as possible. Under the Hard Initial Endowment, all six parcels need to
be traded to achieve efficiency.
Table 2  Initial Endowments
A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1D2 D3 D4
Autarky
Value
Series 1
Easy #3 #1 #2 #1 #3 #2 2700
Moderate #1 #2 #3 #3 #2 #1 2700
Hard #1 #2 #1 #3 #2 #3 2000
Efficient Allocation #3 #3 #3 #1 #1 #1 6600
Series 2
Easy #3 #2 #1 #3 #2 #1 2800
Moderate #3 #1 #2 #1 #3 #2 2800
Hard #1 #2 #1 #3 #2 #3 1600
Efficient Allocation #3 #3 #3 #1 #1 #1 6600
Series 3
Easy #4 #5 #3 #2 #6 #8 #7 #1 #3 #7 #6 #4 #5 #1 #2 #8 5900
Moderate #4 #8 #1 #3 #2 #6 #5 #7 #1 #3 #5 #8 #7 #6 #2 #4 5120
Hard #7 #4 #3 #1 #6 #8 #2 #5 #3 #4 #1 #8 #2 #6 #7 #5 5720
Efficient Allocation #2 #2 #2 #2 #4 #4 #4 #4 #6 #6 #6 #6 #8 #8 #8 #8 13800
Series 4
Easy #2 #3 #7 #4 #4 #5 #3 #8 #6 #2 #1 #7 #8 #5 #6 #1 5150
Moderate #1 #3 #8 #6 #3 #6 #1 #8 #5 #7 #2 #4 #7 #4 #5 #2 4550
Hard #6 #1 #8 #3 #1 #3 #6 #8 #7 #5 #2 #4 #2 #7 #4 #5 5000
Efficient Allocation #2 #2 #2 #2 #4 #4 #4 #4 #6 #6 #6 #6 #8 #8 #8 #8 12000
Note 1: # indicates Subject Identification Number.
Note 2: Bold indicates the efficient allocations.
Note 3: In Series 3, underline indicates the inner parcel is held by the subject with
the second highest stand-alone value. In Series 4, underline indicates the inner
parcel is held by the subject with the highest stand-alone value.
Series 2 to Series 4
Tables 3, 4, and 5 illustrate stand-alone values and equilibrium prices for
Series 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Series 2 is similar to Series 1 except for the
exposure problem. To realize the efficient allocation, agents will have to pay more
than their stand-alone values for inner parcels under competitive equilibrium
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prices. The lower limits of equilibrium prices of A2 and B2 is 500, which is above
300, the stand-alone values of Subject Number 3 and Subject Number 1 for these
parcels, respectively. An agent may face potential exposure to losses if he pays a
price higher than his stand-alone value for an inner parcel, and fails to aggregate
adjoining parcels. Notice the structure of valuations is complementary between
Subject Number 1 and Subject Number 3 in Series 2. It may make it easier for
them to agree on swapping parcels if such trade is allowed.
In Series 3 and 4, we investigate the robustness of the performance of
mechanisms when the number of agents and parcels increase. We achieve this by
increasing the number of agents to eight and the number of parcels to sixteen. The
eight subjects are numbered 1 to 8, and the four locations, A, B, C and D. In each
location there are four parcels. In Series 3, the stand-alone value for the agent who
should obtain it when efficiently allocated is below the lower limit of the
competitive equilibrium price, while in Series 4 equilibrium prices for inner
parcels are above the stand-alone values of the agents who should obtain them
under the efficient allocation, creating the exposure problem.
Table 2 shows initial endowments for all series. Under the Moderate
Initial Endowment in Series 1 and 2, and the Hard Initial Endowment in all series,
all parcels need to be traded to realize the efficient allocations. Under the Hard
Initial Endowment in Series 3, three inner parcels (A2, C1 and D3) are held by the
subjects with the second highest values. Under the Hard Initial Endowment in
Series 4, four inner parcels (A2, B2, C2 and D2) are held by the subjects with the
highest values, making it hard to achieve the efficient allocation.
Table 3  Stand-Alone Values and Competitive Equilibrium Prices in Series 2
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3
Agent ID Stand-Alone Values
#1 900 900 900 1500 300 1500
#2 500 500 500 500 500 500
#3 1500 300 1500 900 900 900
Equilibrium Prices
Lowest 500 500 500 500 500 500
Highest 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
Note 1: Bold indicates the efficient allocation.
Note 2: Gap Cost 1 = 1000, Gap Cost 2 = 1000
Note 3: Equilibrium prices are interdependent. Following constraints
            apply:
PA1 + PA 2 + PA 3 ? PB1 + 2400, PA1 + PA 2 + PA 3 ? PB 2 + 2400, PA1 + PA 2 + PA 3 ? PB 3 + 2400,
PB1 + PB 2 + PB 3 ? PA1 + 2400, PB1 + PB 2 + PB 3 ? PA 2 + 2400, PB1 + PB 2 + PB 3 ? PA 3 + 2400
  
P
A1
+ P
A2
+ P
A3
? P
B1
+ P
B2
+1500, P
A1
+ P
A2
+ P
A3
? P
B2
+ P
B3
+1500,
P
B1
+ P
B2
+ P
B3
? P
A1
+ P
A2
+1500, P
B1
+ P
B2
+ P
B3
? P
A2
+ P
A3
+1500
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Table 4  Stand-Alone Values and Competitive Equilibrium Prices in Series 3
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
ID Stand-Alone Values
#1 500 500 400 400 400 400 400 400
#2 1200 1100 1000 900 500 450 400 400
#3 400 400 400 400 800 800 600 600
#4 1000 900 800 700 1000 900 800 700
#5 400 400 400 400 700 700 500 500
#6 900 800 700 600 700 600 500 400
#7 500 500 400 400 500 500 450 450
#8 600 600 400 400 500 500 450 450
Equilibrium Prices
Lowest 500 500 400 400 800 800 600 600
Highest 1200 1300 1200 900 1000 1100 900 700
C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4
ID Stand-Alone Values
#1 600 600 500 500 400 400 400 400
#2 800 750 700 650 400 400 400 400
#3 800 800 700 700 400 400 400 400
#4 1000 900 800 700 400 400 400 400
#5 500 500 500 500 400 400 400 400
#6 1200 1100 1000 900 400 400 400 400
#7 600 600 400 400 420 420 420 420
#8 800 800 800 800 500 500 500 500
Equilibrium Prices
Lowest 800 800 700 700 420 420 420 420
Highest 1200 1300 1200 900 500 580 580 500
Note 1: Bold indicates the efficient allocation.
Note 2: Gap Cost 1 = 200, Gap Cost 2 = 200
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Table 5  Stand-Alone Values and Competitive Equilibrium Prices in Series 4
A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4
ID Stand-Alone Values
#1 250 750 750 250 300 600 600 300
#2 1000 600 600 1000 800 200 200 800
#3 200 700 700 200 250 650 650 250
#4 650 100 100 650 900 500 500 900
#5 200 700 700 200 300 600 600 300
#6 900 200 200 900 850 200 200 850
#7 200 700 700 200 300 600 600 300
#8 950 200 200 950 850 100 100 850
Equilibrium Prices
Lowest 250 750 750 250 300 650 650 300
Highest 700 1000 1000 700 600 900 900 600
C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4
ID Stand-Alone Values
#1 200 700 700 200 150 450 450 150
#2 1100 300 300 1100 800 100 100 800
#3 300 700 700 300 100 480 480 100
#4 1000 200 200 1000 700 250 250 700
#5 250 750 750 250 300 400 400 300
#6 1200 600 600 1200 700 100 100 700
#7 250 700 700 250 100 500 500 100
#8 1100 100 100 1100 800 400 400 800
Equilibrium Prices
Lowest 300 750 750 300 300 500 500 300
Highest 900 1000 1000 900 600 800 800 600
Note 1:Bold indicates the efficient allocation.
Note 2: Gap Cost 1 = 400, Gap Cost 2 = 400
3 Mechanisms Tested
We study the performance of three exchange mechanisms: an oral double auction
mechanism, direct negotiations (committee), and the combined-value call market.
The Hungarian government conducted oral one-sided auction when they
privatized land (Swain, 1994). Burger reports that the auctions brought about land
fragmentation, hampering agricultural growth (Burger, 2001). The negotiation
procedure is similar to the market-assisted land reform conducted in several
developing countries (Deininger, 1999).
10
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The key difference between the negotiation procedure in our experiment
and the market-assisted reform is in the market-assisted reform, farmers have to
search for potential trading partners and negotiate with them bilaterally, whereas
under the negotiation procedure in our experiment, subjects deal with all potential
trading partners simultaneously. The combined-value call market is known to
outperform simultaneous auction when the market is one-sided and there are
synergies across commodities. We investigate 1) whether the combined-value call
market outperforms simple auction mechanisms even when markets are two-
sided, 2) if the double auction does better than other mechanisms as long as there
exist competitive equilibrium prices, and 3) face-to-face communication under
direct negotiations improves efficiency of trade.
Oral Double Auction (DA)
An oral double auction comprises parallel, unconnected markets, i.e., a
market is created for each commodity, and is open simultaneously. During a
trading period, agents make verbal bids to buy a certain commodity at a specified
price, or make offers to sell a commodity for a specified price. A unit is traded
when a buyer accepts an existing offer or when a seller accepts an existing bid.
Cancellation of bids and asks and resale are all allowed. The double auction has
been shown to generate efficient outcome in a wide variety of settings (Plott and
Smith, 1978).
In the double auction scheme, subjects can trade only one unit in each
transaction, and contingent trades are not allowed. This is a critical difference
between oral double auctions and other two mechanisms tested. When each
transaction takes place, subjects do not know what terms of trade will be available
afterwards. This forces subjects to face complex decision making problems such
as when and how much to bid or ask, and whether or not to accept the bids or asks
offered by others.
Direct Negotiation (Committee)
Under the direct negotiation, all subjects sit at one table and directly
negotiate with one another. Subjects can purchase, sell, and exchange individual
commodities or package of commodities with any other subjects. They can freely
discuss the terms of trade among themselves, bilaterally or multilaterally. They
are also allowed to design their own trading rules if they wish. However, they are
not allowed to directly reveal their valuations to others. Each period lasts for at
most 12 minutes. One advantage of direct negotiations (as well as the Combined
Value Call Market, CVCM, discussed in the next section) over double auctions is
that package trades including swapping3 is possible.
                                                 
3 Swapping implies exchange of parcels without side payments.
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Let us suppose exchange always occurs between pairs of agents, and in
each trade, agents exchange as many parcels as they want. Provided pairs of
agents achieve pair-wise efficiency4 every time they meet, the minimum number
of trades required to realize the efficient allocations is 3 for Series 1 and 2 under
all initial endowments. Even though the minimum number of trades required to
realize efficient allocations is the same in Series 1 and 2, the complementary
structure of the individuals’ valuations may make it easier for subjects to conduct
bilateral trades via swapping in Series 2.
Valley et al. (2002) illustrate how face-to-face communication enhance
efficiency in a sealed-bid mechanism. Parkhurst et at. (2002) show that pre-play
communication and random pairings highly resolve fragmentation of land for
habitat in a laboratory experiment. As the number of both tradable objects and
agents increases, however, it may become harder for an agent to find a trading
partner with compatible needs. Under the Easy Environment in Series 3, it takes
the minimum of ten trades to achieve efficient allocations, even if each trade is
pair-wise efficient. In Series 4, there does not exist a sequence of pair-wise
efficient trades that lead to the efficient allocation.
The Combined Value Call Market (CVCM)
A combined value call market (CVCM) is a computerized auction
mechanism that collects bids from agents and selects an allocation that maximizes
trading surplus. The major advantage of CVCM over double auctions is that
CVCM allows package bidding. CVCM is expected to mitigate the coordination
problems of direct negotiations. An automated system maximizes total surplus by
matching buy and sell orders submitted by all subjects. CVCM has several
important features. It’s continuous in the sense that subjects can submit bids
anytime during a trading round. The system provides immediate feedback of bids
submitted by others and provisional prices, i.e., the prices subjects need to offer if
they want to win the items. Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine and Smith (2003) assert
that auction systems which provide simultaneous feedback and allow bidders to
revise their bids produce higher efficiency. The system is also iterative in the
sense that a trading period consists of several rounds, and after each round,
holdings of commodities are updated. The iterative procedure allows round-by-
round update of allocations. Porter, Rassenti, Poopnarine and Smith (2003)
reports that in complex economic environments, iterative auctions produce better
results than the auction mechanism without iterative features.
The CVCM works as follows: There are several trading periods. Each
period consists of 3 rounds in Series 1 and 2, and 4 rounds in Series 3 and 4.
                                                 
4 An attainable allocation is pairwise efficient if it is impossible for any two agents to
improve their utilities by trading each other.
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During a trading round, Subjects can submit bids to buy and/or sell an individual
parcel or a combination of parcels. For example, Subject Number 1 could place an
order to buy Commodity A1 for 1200 francs, buy A3 for 1000 francs, and sell B3
for 500 francs. This bid will allow him to obtain A1 and A3 in return for B3 and
pay at most 1700 francs (=1200+1000-500). During a round, subjects can see all
the bids placed by other players and all the bids they have placed. The above bid
submitted by Subject Number 1 will appear as “Offer B3 and 1700 for A1 and
A3” on the screen. The Subject identification is not shown on the computer
screen. Based on the bids submitted by subjects, the computer calculates a set of
provisional prices, i.e., the prices subjects need to offer if they want to win the
items. The information is updated approximately every 10 seconds. Thus, agents
can adjust bids in response to new bids from other subjects and well as
provisional prices.
At the end of a round, all standing bids will be transacted, and the
consequent holdings will be the initial portfolio for the following round. After the
last round, the final endowments of the period are determined. We employ fixed
ending time, and the remaining time is shown on the computer screen in each
round. The first round in the first period lasts 7 minutes. The length of rounds is
then gradually shortened.  From the third period until the last periods, each round
is 2 minutes.5 Whether the number of rounds per period chosen above is
appropriate is open to discussion. Bossaerts, Fine and Ledyard (2002) report that
in their thin financial market experiments using the same combined-value call
market mechanism, reducing the number of rounds forces trading to occur earlier
in a period. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) show how in one-sided auctions, fixed
ending time induces bidders to delay their bids. The same argument may apply to
CVCM since the number of rounds is predetermined, and the hard closing (fixed-
ending time) is used in CVCM. The strategic reason for late bidding could be to
conceal their willingness to pay as well as observing bids submitted by other
subjects.
One may argue that providing subjects with full information on orders
placed by other bidders could potentially prevent the economy from realizing
efficient allocations. Arifovic and Ledyard (2003) demonstrate that in call
markets, equilibrium prices and volume are achieved faster when traders receive
information only about the trading price, but not bids and offers by others. Porter,
Rassenti, Roopnarine and Smith (2003) also control strategic behavior in their
one-sided combinatorial auctions by feeding back only the information on item
prices. They argue that bidders do not need to know who is bidding, how many
are bidding, and on which items or packages they are bidding. We will take into
account the above strategic problems when analyzing experimental results.
                                                 
5  The number of periods varies from 5 in Series 3 to 9 in Series 1 and 2. See Table 6.
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4 Experimental Procedures
A total of 34 sessions, 26 sessions at the California Institute of Technology (CIT)
and 8 sessions at the University of Hawaii (UH), were conducted. The general
structure of the experiments is shown in Table 6. For each series, two or three
sessions of the combined value call markets, oral double auctions, and direct
negotiations were carried out at CIT. Having observed the superior performance
of direct negotiations at CIT, we conducted eight sessions of the direct
negotiations, two for each series, at UH. The purpose was to check the robustness
of the high performance of direct negotiations with subjects who have not been
exposed to many economic experiments and various types of trading institutions
as may CIT subjects have.
At CIT, subjects were undergraduate students who had previous
experience participating in a number of economics experiments of various types.
Some subjects participated in more than one session, but were not allowed to
participate in two of the same series. The combined value call markets were
computerized experiments, and were conducted at the Caltech Social Science
Experimental Laboratory. The oral double auctions and direct negotiations were
conducted in non-computerized classroom settings where the experimenter could
use black boards. At the University of Hawaii, subjects were undergraduate
students who either had never participated in economics experiments, or had only
participated in other, unrelated experiments in oral double auction.
Each experiment consisted of several periods. In Series 1 and 2, the three
sets of initial endowments were repeated three times in an Easy-Moderate-Hard
cycle, i.e., the Easy Endowment was used in Periods 1, 4 and 7, the Moderate
Endowment was used in Periods 2, 5 and 8, the Hard Endowments were used in
Periods 3, 6 and 9. In Series 3 and 4, the three sets of initial endowments were
repeated two times, i.e., the Easy Endowment was used in Periods 1 and 4, the
Moderate Endowment was used in Periods 2 and 5, the Hard Endowments were
used in periods 3 and 6.
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Table 6 List of Experiments
Exp. ID Series Mechanism LocationSubjects Periods
Conversion
Rate
Average
Earning
($)
CVCM 1-(1) 1 CVCM CIT 3 6 0.001 33.3
CVCM 1-(2) 1 CVCM CIT 3 9 0.0014 33.0
CVCM 1-(3) 1 CVCM CIT 3 9 0.0014 31.0
DA 1-(1) 1 DA CIT 3 6 0.001 35.0
DA 1-(2) 1 DA CIT 3 9 0.0014 33.0
DA 1-(3) 1 DA CIT 3 9 0.0014 35.0
Com 1-(CIT1) 1 Committee CIT 3 9 0.0014 35.0
Com 1-(CIT2) 1 Committee CIT 3 9 0.0014 35.0
Com 1-(UH1) 1 Committee UH 3 9 0.0014 25.5
Com 1-(UH2) 1 Committee UH 3 9 0.0014 25.0
CVCM 2-(1) 2 CVCM CIT 3 9 0.0013 35.7
CVCM 2-(2) 2 CVCM CIT 3 8 0.0013 33.7
DA 2-(1) 2 DA CIT 3 9 0.0013 30.1
DA 2-(2) 2 DA CIT 3 9 0.0013 34.6
Com 2-(CIT1) 2 Committee CIT 3 9 0.0013 34.3
Com 2-(CIT2) 2 Committee CIT 3 9 0.0013 36.0
Com 2-(UH1) 2 Committee UH 3 9 0.0012 24.7
Com 2-(UH2) 2 Committee UH 3 9 0.0012 26.0
CVCM 3-(1) 3 CVCM CIT 8 5 0.0017 30.8
CVCM 3-(2) 3 CVCM CIT 8 5 0.0017 32.5
DA 3-(1) 3 DA CIT 8 6 0.0017 24.0
DA 3-(2) 3 DA CIT 8 6 0.0017 25.3
Com 3-(CIT1) 3 Committee CIT 8 6 0.0017 33.6
Com 3-(CIT2) 3 Committee CIT 8 6 0.0017 33.9
Com 3-(UH1) 3 Committee UH 8 6 0.0012 25.5
Com 3-(UH2) 3 Committee UH 8 6 0.0012 24.0
CVCM 4-(1) 4 CVCM CIT 8 6 0.0024 31.9
CVCM 4-(2) 4 CVCM CIT 8 6 0.0024 31.9
DA 4-(1) 4 DA CIT 8 6 0.0024 34.4
DA 4-(2) 4 DA CIT 8 6 0.0024 30.1
Com 4-(CIT1) 4 Committee CIT 8 6 0.0024 32.0
Com 4-(CIT2) 4 Committee CIT 8 6 0.0024 33.6
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Com 4-(UH1) 4 Committee UH 8 6 0.0015 24.9
Com 4-(UH2) 4 Committee UH 8 6 0.0015 24.0
5 Results
We will consider efficiency gain as the key measure of performance. The
efficiency gain is measured as the realized increase in total values as a percentage
of the maximum possible increase. We do not use the usual measure of efficiency
because the efficiency levels of initial endowments differ across treatments.
Table 7 shows the mean efficiency gain by mechanism and initial
endowment for each series. It also contains the results of Man-Whitney rank sum
tests of the differences in efficiency gain. In most initial endowments in Series 3
and 4, the efficiency gain is highest under the direct negotiations at CIT. On the
other hand, the efficiency gain under the direct negotiations at UH is the lowest in
most conditions. This implies face-to-face negotiations produce higher efficiency
than the other mechanisms when the number of commodities and subjects is
increased, but subjects need to be trained to realize efficiency gains.6 The double
auction achieves high efficiency gain under the Easy Endowments in Series 1 and
2, but do not perform well when initial endowments are more difficult and the
number of subjects and commodities are increased.
Efficiency gain is higher in CVCM experiments relative to other
mechanisms in the Hard Environment in Series 2. Recall the valuations in Series 2
have complementary structures. Figure 2 shows the fractions of units traded by
packages and single units. Over 80 per cent of parcels were traded as parts of
package trades in CVCM in Series 2. Most of the package trades were made
between Players 1 and 3 with no side payment, i.e., swapping. In fact, CVCM
performs relatively well under all initial endowments in Series 2 and 4. This
suggests CVCM alleviates the exposure problem. CVCM also outperforms other
mechanisms in the Easy Environment in Series 3. This indicates that CVCM
performs well when the number of subjects and commodities is increased but the
initial endowment is easy. However, the efficiency gain significantly diminishes
in the Moderate and Hard Environments. The number of rounds may not have
been sufficient to allow a large volume of trade.
                                                 
6 The difference in performance may have resulted from the difference in the
characteristics of students in two schools. CIT is a small school and students are accustomed to
problem solving. UH is a state school with a large diversity of students.
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Table 7 Mean Efficiency Gain by Initial Endowment, Series and Mechanism
Series Initial
Endowment
CVCM DA Com (CIT) Com (UH)
1 Easy .87 .98 VV .95 .93
Moderate .87 .92 .99 VV, D, HH .82
Hard .73 .82 H .98 VVV, HHH .64
2 Easy .89 .96 .89 .89
Moderate .94 .87 .89 .81
Hard 1.00 DDD, CC, HHH .76 .85 D, H .76
3 Easy .99 DD, HH .83 .93 .84
Moderate .82 .89 .95 VV, D, H .69
Hard .67 .84 V .97 V, D .79
4 Easy .84 .79 .85 .80
Moderate .72 .63 .80 DD, HH .66
Hard .78 HH .74 .85 HH .74
Note:
VVV,VV,V indicate the mean efficiency gain of that treatment is higher than the mean
efficiency gain of CVCM at the 1, 5 and 10 % significant levels, respectively.
DDD,DD,D indicate the mean efficiency gain of that treatment is higher than the mean
efficiency gain of DA at the 1, 5 and 10 % significant levels, respectively.
CCC,CC,C indicate the mean efficiency gain of that treatment is higher than the mean
efficiency gain of Com (CIT) at the 1, 5 and 10 % significant levels, respectively.
HHH,HH,H indicate the mean efficiency gain of that treatment is higher than the mean
efficiency gain of Com (UH) at the 1, 5 and 10 % significant levels, respectively.
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Figure 2  Proportion of units traded by packages and single units
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The question is why is CVCM so unsuccessful in Series 1? Figures 3, 4, 5
and 6 present the relations between efficiency gain and the timing of trades in
Series 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. As shown in Figure 3, the efficiency gain falls
in Series 1 when subjects exercise “holdouts”, i.e., they wait until later rounds to
start trading. For example, in CVCM 1-(1) and 1-(2) the efficiency gain is low
especially when subjects wait until the third round to trade. This makes it difficult
for them to complete the necessary transactions to achieve the efficient allocation.
In Series 2, subjects also have a tendency to hesitate to trade in early periods, but
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become keen to trade in later periods. It seems that Players 1 and 3 established the
swapping routine by then. On the other hand, a certain number of parcels are
traded in every period in Series 3 and 4, indicating subjects do not exercise
holdouts when the number of subjects and commodities are increased.
Since we did not vary the number of rounds, we cannot offer any
conclusion on the effects of the number of rounds on trading behavior. However,
it seems that when markets are very thin, with only three subjects and six
commodities to trade, subjects are hesitant to trade in early rounds. One possible
explanation might be the subject’s reluctance to reveal their willingness to pay for
individual objects. One may argue that providing subjects with full information on
orders placed by other bidders may prevent the economy from realizing efficient
allocations, as Arifovic and Ledyard (2003) demonstrated for call markets. There
may be both advantages and disadvantages to limit the information on orders. In
Series 2 of our experiments, subjects quickly realize the complementary structure
of valuations by observing each other’s orders. If the information on orders
submitted by others is limited, it may not have been possible to discover the
complementary structure. Our experimental results in Series 2 demonstrate how
providing information on orders of other subjects may better facilitate swapping.
Let us now consider why the direct negotiations at CIT outperform other
mechanisms. Do they take better advantages of package trades? As shown in
Figure 2, over 70 per cent of trades in the direct negotiations at CIT are package
trades in Series 1, and its efficiency gain is significantly higher than other
mechanisms. On the other hand, the direct negotiations at CIT did not make any
package trades in Series 3 and 4. They conducted sequential double auctions,
instead. As discussed in Section 3, it becomes harder for a subject to find a
trading partner with compatible needs as the number of both tradable objects and
agents increase. In case of Series 4, there does not exist a sequence of pair-wise
efficient trades that lead to the efficient allocation. The direct negotiations at CIT
handle this difficulty by organizing sequential double auctions.
To examine the impact of package trades on efficiency gain, we conducted
fixed-effect model regressions for CVCM and the direct negotiations. The data
from Series 1 and 2, and Series 3 and 4 was pooled together for each mechanism,
respectively. Since we conducted only two or three experiments for each
treatment, we need to account for group effects. For this reason, we use the fixed-
effect approach. A dependent variable is the efficiency gain by period, and
independent variables are the number of units traded as packages (“Package”), the
cross effects of Series 2 (Series 4) with “Package”, dummy variables for Series 2
(Series 4) and for each initial endowment in each Series, and a variable called
“Learning”. The learning variable is defined as the i-th period divided by the total
number of periods for each period i in the experiment. If the coefficient of the
learning variable is positive and significant, the efficiency gain improves in later
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periods. For CVCM, we also include the number of units traded in the first round
of each period as an independent variable. Its positive coefficient indicates more
active trades in the first round improve efficiency.
Table 8 contains the regression results.7 Notice the dummy variables for
initial endowments are all insignificant in all series in the direct negotiations at
CIT. This suggests the performance of direct negotiations is robust across
different endowments at CIT. The table confirms package trading has positive
effects on efficiency gain in Series 1 and 2 under CVCM and the direct
negotiations at CIT, as well as in Series 3 and 4 in the direct negotiations at UH.
The cross effects of Series 2 and Package is positive and significant for the direct
negotiations at CIT. This implies package trading was particularly important in
Series 2.  In the negotiation procedures at CIT, the coefficient of package trades is
not reported for Series 3 and 4 since no experimental group conducted package
trades.
The coefficient of the number of trades in round 1 is significant for Series
1 and 2 of CVCM, supporting our preceding argument that holdout has negative
effects on the performance of CVCM when the number of subjects and
commodities is small. The learning variable is significant and positive for the
direct negotiation procedures at both CIT and UH in Series 3 and 4. This suggests
when the number of commodities increase, it takes some periods to aggregate
information and coordinate trades.
                                                 
7  The regression results are comparable when we use efficiency or absolute size of the
realized surplus as dependent variables instead of efficiency gain.
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Figure 3  Efficiency and number of trade by round in CVCM, Series 1
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Figure 4  Efficiency and number of trade by round in CVCM, Series 2
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Figure 5  Efficiency and number of trade by round in CVCM, Series 3
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Figure 6  Efficiency and number of trade by round in CVCM, Series 4
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Table 8 Fixed-effect model estimates of efficiency gains for CVCM and direct
negotiations
Variables CVCM ? Com (CIT) ? Com (UH) ?
Series 1 and 2
# of trades in round 1 0.05 ***
Package 0.04 *** 0.01 ** 0.00
Package*Series2 0.02 0.03 ** -0.01
D(Series 1 Moderate) 0.01 0.03 -0.10
D(Series 1 Hard) -0.18 *** -0.01 -0.29***
D(Series 2) -0.16 * -0.10 * -0.03
D(Series 2 Moderate) 0.02 -0.02 -0.08
D(Series 2 Hard) -0.18 ** -0.07 -0.13
Learning -0.11 -0.01 0.01
Constant 0.87 *** 0.94 *** 0.92 ***
R2 0.49 0.35 0.35
Series 3 and 4
# of trades in round 1 0.02 *
Package 0.00 0.03 ***
Package*Series4 0.01 -0.02
D(Series 3 Moderate) -0.13 *** 0.00 -0.09
D(Series 3 Hard) -0.31 *** 0.01 -0.13*
D(Series 4) -0.08 -0.08 0.12
D(Series 4 Moderate) -0.09 -0.06 -0.17*
D(Series 4 Hard) 0.01 -0.02 -0.10
Learning -0.12 ** 0.08 * 0.21 ***
Constant 0.95 *** 0.90 *** 0.54 ***
R2 0.84 ? 0.60 ? 0.58 ?
      Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.
      *** Significant at the 1% level.
25
Tanaka: Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
6 Conclusions
Direct negotiations produce higher efficiency than the other two mechanisms. The
two-sided combinatorial call markets (CVCM) do not always yield high
efficiency, but seems to alleviate the exposure problem. CVCM performs
particularly well when swapping is easy, such as in Series 2. This might be
because swapping makes subjects willing to reveal their incentives to trade. When
a subject places a package bid under CVCM, his bidding/asking prices for
individual items do not appear on the screen. Limiting the information on orders
by other subjects may prevent them from finding compatible needs of other
subjects in CVCM. CVCM also performs better than other mechanisms when the
number of subjects and commodities are increased, but initial endowments and
valuations are unchallenging.
We have identified a strategic behavior problem auction studies may face
when they extend their research to two-sided markets. When the market is one-
sided, the combinatorial markets are known to perform better than other
mechanisms. We have shown in two-sided combinatorial markets subject attempts
to strategically holdout commodities when the number of subjects and
commodities is small. This phenomenon was not observed when the markets are
one-sided and subjects are not given initial endowments of commodities.
Resource allocation problems are not subject-matter neutral, and the land
allocation problems should be considered within specific social and political
contexts. In addition to land exchanges, land consolidation projects often
incorporate the improvement of irrigation and transport systems.  Our research
abstract out these aspects. Also, in our experiment, we have a small number of
subjects and commodities compared with the real world land redistribution
problems. For these reasons, our experimental results cannot be directly applied to
the real world land redistribution problems where there are hundreds of farmers
and land parcels involved.
Nevertheless, this study yields a couple of policy implications for designing
land consolidation mechanisms. Our experimental results show direct negotiation
procedures perform better than other mechanisms when subjects are trained.
When subjects are not trained, they do not easily realize high efficiency.
Individuals need sufficient experience in a variety of trading institutions to
discover the way to efficiently reallocate resources. The direct negotiations
resemble the market assisted land reforms, which have been implemented in
several developing countries (Deininger, 1999). Under the market-assisted land
reforms, the government provides grants to farmers so they can purchase land
plots. The key difference between the negotiation procedure in our experiment
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and the market-assisted reform is under the negotiation procedure, subjects deal
with all potential trading partners simultaneously whereas in the market-assisted
reform, farmers have to search for potential trading partners and negotiate with
them bilaterally. We expect the market-assisted reform to involve higher
transaction costs. Our experimental results indicate the government may need to
play an active role in coordinating land transactions.
CVCM is expected to mitigate the coordination problems of direct
negotiations by shifting computational burdens from agent to computers. A
number of studies have demonstrated how one-sided combinatorial auctions
outperform double auctions, simultaneous and sequential one-sided auctions
under complex environments. When we extend the study to two-sided exchange
markets, subjects exercise holdouts when the number of subjects and commodities
is small. However, when swapping is easy or when the number of subjects and
commodities increase, they stop holding out. This indicates that CVCM may
perform better than other mechanisms when we increase the number of subjects
and commodities. Unlike our experiments with a small group of participants, land
reforms often involve a number of farmers and parcels. CVCM may be a superior
mechanism when a large number of participants and land parcels are involved in
the redistribution scheme.
Our experimental setting left out the role of credit markets and the provision
of public good (such as road and irrigation systems) in land consolidation
projects.  Potential extensions of this study are 1) to introduce credit markets and
the use of land as collateral and investigate the interaction between credit and land
markets, and 2) to investigate how the provision of public good eases the tension
among traders.
Appendix
This appendix describes the structure of Gap Costs used in the experiment. In
Series 1 and 2, there are three agents, numbered 1, 2, and 3, and two locations, A
and B. In each location there are three parcels. There are a total of six parcels in
the economy; A1, A2, A3, B1, B2 and B3 as shown below.
A1 A2 A3
B1 B2 B3
The value of a bundle of parcels is the sum of the stand-alone values (see
Tables 1 and 3) minus Gap Costs 1 and 2. If a subject has A1 and A3 (B1 and B3)
but not A2 (B2) at the end of the period, he will have to bear 1000 francs of Gap
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Cost 1. If he has parcels in both Locations A and B, then he will have to bear
additional 1000 francs of Gap Cost 2.
In Series 3 and 4, there are eight agents, and four locations. The eight
subjects are numbered 1 to 8, and the four locations, A, B, C and D. In each
location there are four parcels. Thus there are a total of sixteen parcels in the
economy; A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, B4, C1, C2, C3, C4, D1, D2, D3 and D4.
Following is the geographical representation of locations of above parcels.
A1 A2 A3 A4
B1 B2 B3 B4
C1 C2 C3 C4
D1 D2 D3 D4
Gap Cost 1 and Gap Cost 2 are both 200 francs in Series 3. A subject is
penalized 200 francs for each “gap” in each location. For example if he holds A1
and A3 but not A2, he will be penalized 200 francs. If he holds A1 and A4, but
not A2 and A3, he will be penalized 400 francs.
Gap Cost 2 increases with the distance an agent needs to travel between
the most distant locations in his holdings. If a subject holds parcels in Locations A
and B but not in C or D, then Gap Cost 2 is 200 francs. If a subject holds parcels
in Locations A and C but not in D, then Gap Cost 2 is 400 francs. It does not
matter whether he holds parcels in Location B because Gap Cost 2 correlates with
the distance an agent needs to travel between the most distant locations. If a
subject has parcels in both Locations A and D, then Gap Cost 2 increases to 600
francs. In Series 4, the structure of the gap costs is the same as Series 3, but is
twice as large (400 francs). We double Gap Costs to make exposure problems
more severe.
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